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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note argues that national regimes of land-use regulation-the
whole body of a country's institutions, laws, and jurisprudence that regulates
building and development-can be understood only in the context of distinct
political and legal regimes. National land-use regimes do not arise in response
to universal laws of the market that exert the same influence at any location on
the planet. Rather, land-use regimes differ from country to country. They are
embedded in a complex, historically developing framework of ideology, law,
and culture. If land-use controls regulate the physical shape of the
communities we live in, then it is history itself that regulates what kind of
t J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School, 1999. I would like to thank Professor Carol Rose of the
Yale Law School, Professor David Cameron of the Yale University Department of Political Science, and
Attorney Fridolin Walther of Bern, Switzerland, for their valuable assistance in the writing of this Note.
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community we view as wholesome, normal, and desirable-our ideas of what
"the city" and "the good city" mean.
Much thinking about land-use topics in the United States seems to be
predicated on the unspoken assumption that metropolitan development can
only follow the pattern it has taken in the United States since World War II,
namely that of business and residential expansion on the urban periphery,
"dispersed in a pattern that can only be served by the single occupant auto."'
In fact, however, other countries have selected, and continue to pursue,
radically different land-use regimes. By examining such alternatives to
American policies, we are forced to confront the fact that much of what we
take for granted about the American metropolitan scene can be traced to
concrete political choices. Ultimately, the comparative approach helps
demonstrate that Americans, like other peoples, have a particular idea of the
good city; that our idea arises out of our history, culture, and legal doctrine;
and that this idea can be recognized in many aspects of a country's regime of
land-use regulation.
What follows is a comparative study of the land-use regimes of the
United States, Germany, and Switzerland. The two European cases were
selected primarily because they represent an idea of the good city that
diverges dramatically from the American one. This German-Swiss idea, as
instantiated in land-use policies, has imposed radically different urban forms
than those that prevail on this shore of the Atlantic. One may well question the
differences between American and German-Swiss urban forms. Why do
American cities sometimes merge with each other along lines of roads and
highways, while Swiss towns are separated from each other by expanses of
fields or woodland? Why do even affluent Germans tolerate small, expensive
living quarters, while American suburbanites spread out in ever larger houses
and lots? And why have German and Swiss cities largely succeeded in
preserving a monopoly over retail establishments, even as American
downtowns have emptied out in the face of competition from out-of-town
shopping centers?
The short answer to these questions is that the legal regime governing
land use in the United States does not share certain common features of the
analogous regimes in the two European countries. The German and Swiss
land-use regimes concentrate on the goal of preserving traditional, compact
urban areas defined by legally established growth perimeters and ringed by
countryside untouched by urbanization. American land-use controls, by
contrast, do not attempt to preserve this traditional urban form, which has
been eroding in the United States with particular rapidity since the beginning
of the post-World War II economic boom. Rather, it will be argued in this
Note, American land-use controls are essentially oriented toward promoting
single-family homes and protecting their occupants.
1. Paul J. Pezzotta II, Emerging Evidence of the Erosion of Economic Competitiveness
Caused by Development Patterns Based on the Single Occupant Auto, 30 URB. LAw. 507, 511 (1998).
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This Note analyzes how and why these two European states have
adopted measures to preserve the traditional shape of their cities and towns,
and why Americans have chosen not to do so. This difference between the
land-use regimes stems from fundamentally different ideas of the city.
Germans and Swiss understand the city as a historically unfolding entity with
its own corporate personality, its own social structure, and its own
indispensable function in the political system. The city plays an essential role
in shaping and preserving the regional and national social order. Finally, the
German and Swiss city is conceptually and administratively integrated within
its agricultural hinterland, a tended municipal realm with its own special
function in public life. Americans have lost, or perhaps rejected, this concept
of the city as an essential mediator in social life. The American city, it will be
argued, has come to be defined in public law as a neutral space in which can
be realized the competing ambitions both of subsidiary actors-households-
and of superior ones-higher levels of government.
Why these three countries? Arguably, most European land-use
regulatory systems outside Great Britain share a similar legal and
administrative framework.2 Germany and Switzerland may not even qualify as
the most systematically planned land-use systems on the continent.
Nonetheless, they do stand out in some respects. First, Germany and its
neighbor Switzerland both represent a history of urban autonomy and prestige
within national political systems, a legacy differing radically from the path
taken in the United States.4 In addition, as will be explained below, Germany
developed the modem urban planning profession.5 To this day, as a result,
German and Swiss legislation and scholarly writing on land-use planning
convey with particular clarity the underlying ideological construction of the
city that drives the whole system.6 Thus, a contrast of Germany and
Switzerland against the United States illustrates how differing ideologies of
the city produce distinct outcomes in the regulation of urban form.
Despite these strengths of the comparison, it should be frankly
acknowledged at the outset that this Note is only the beginning of what would
need to be a more comprehensive examination of land-use regulatory systems
across the developed (and possibly also the developing) world. Only such a
comparison, involving numerous countries and taking into account many
variables, could really produce a robust theory of the relation between national
political cultures and land-use regimes. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this
Note, by presenting what is necessarily a highly stylized claim based on a few
examples, will serve to instigate further research to test the hypothesis that the
2. See PETER NEwMAN & ANDY THORNLEY, URBAN PLANNING IN EUROPE: INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION, NATIONAL SYSTEMS, AND PLANNING PROJECrs 71 (1996) (noting a broad similarity
among Continental land-use regulation systems as contrasted with the more centralized, adversarial, and
ad hoc procedures in England and Wales).
3. See id. at 49-50 (calling the Netherlands the "most planned" country in Europe).
4. See infra Section HLI.A.
5. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g.; infra text accompanying notes 87, 97, & 98 (describing influences of city ideals
on land-use policies and debates).
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regulation of urban form is powerfully influenced by the ideological and legal
construction of the city.
The remainder of this Note is organized as follows. Part II offers a brief
comparison of the land-use regimes of the United States, Germany, and
Switzerland, in the course of which each regime's techniques and goals are
analyzed. This primarily descriptive Part is followed in Part III by an attempt
to explain these outcomes in terms of the differing historical development of
cities within the social and political systems of the three countries. Finally,
Part IV argues that America's national land-use regime on the one hand, and
Switzerland's and Germany's on the other, reflect differing responses to
modernity. America's land-use system reflects, at least in part, a radical
rejection of European social norms; the German and Swiss systems reflect a
conservative unease with industrial society that tries to conserve important
aspects of the preindustrial community.
II. BASIC ELEMENTS OF LAND-USE REGIMES IN THE UNITED STATES,
GERMANY, AND SWITZERLAND
In this Part it is argued that while American land-use policies aim at the
safeguarding of private life, German and Swiss policies aim at the shaping of
public space. American policies feature fragmented decision-making,
concentrated in municipalities, and focus on the protection of single-family
residences. German and Swiss laws, by contrast, involve all levels of
government in concert and are devoted to preserving a certain urban form: the
compact city.
A. The United States: A Fragmented and Relatively Unplanned Land-Use
Regime
American land-use controls are marked by a few particularly noteworthy
characteristics: the comparative weakness of overt involvement by state and
federal government in local land-use controls; the corresponding delegation of
land-use regulatory power to municipalities; the reliance on zoning as the
preeminent method of local land-use controls and the relatively weak links
between zoning and comprehensive land-use planning; and the ubiquitous use
of zoning to effect the separation of "incompatible" residential and non-
residential uses-and particularly the protection of single-family homes from
"lower" uses.
1. The U.S. Regime: Basic Structure
One of the most noteworthy facts about land-use controls in the United
States is the extreme localization (and consequently, fragmentation) of their
implementation. Apart from some relatively recent environmental legislation,
to be discussed shortly, the federal government plays a fairly limited overt
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role in the land-use controls governing privately owned land.7 The states
ostensibly have the right to regulate land use as part of the police power.8
Significantly, however, most states have chosen to delegate most of their land-
use regulatory powers to local governments. 9 Moreover, states have been slow
to allow the growth of land-use controls and planning by units of government
larger than a municipality. 10 The largest political subdivisions commonly
permitted to impose land-use controls or to prepare and adopt comprehensive
plans for community development are counties, and these usually are
restricted to regulating lands that are outside the incorporated areas contained
within their borders." In other words, land-use controls are implemented
largely by cities and towns acting in isolation:
Admittedly, some erosion of the pattern of exclusively local regulation
became visible with the rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s. In
an era dubbed "The Quiet Revolution" after the 1971 book by Fred Bosselman
and David Callies,12 it briefly seemed that local government control of land
use would be extensively supplanted by state and federal regulation.
Bosselman and Callies identified a number of innovative programs regulating
land-use decisions on a statewide, or at least a regional, level.
1 3
Among these experiments, Hawaii's statewide land-use law stands out
as the first and still among the most strict and comprehensive in the United
States. 14 Adopted in 1961, soon after Hawaiian statehood, the law essentially
broke with the typical pattern of local control and created a state agency to
administer the policy, which called for division of the state's land area into
land-use "districts" of three different kinds, only one of which could contain
urban development.1 5 A few other states, such as Maine and Vermont, also
7. The federal government has played an important role in land-use management in the vast
lands owned by the United States, principally in the western states. As recently as 1975, this federally
owned land comprised one-third of the entire surface area of the United States; in 1993 the proportion
was still 28.6 percent See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES 1996, 228 tbi.364 (1996).
8. The police power is the general regulatory power of the state to promote "order, safety,
health, morals, and the general welfare of society, within constitutional limits" and without
compensation to those affected by the regulation. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 432 (1984); see also
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389-90 (1926) (holding the exclusion of
industrial development from residential areas, even when such exclusion is to the detriment of industry
itself, to be a valid exercise of the police power).




12. FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
(1971).
13. Bosseiman and Callies examine several state policies and regional land-use entities not
discussed in this Note, including the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission
and the Twin Cities (Minneapolis-St. Paul) Metropolitan Commission. See id. at 108-35, 136-63.
14. See Act of July 11, 1961, act 187, 1961 Haw. Sess. Laws 299 (codified as amended at
HAW. REV. STAT. § 205 (1997)); see also BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 12, at 5 ("The quiet
revolution in land use control saw its first legislative success with the Hawaiian Legislature's passage of
the Land Use Law in 1961.").
15. See Act of July 11, 1961, act 187, 1961 Haw. Sess. Laws at 300 (classifying all land as
either urban, agricultural, or rural); see also BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 12, at 7-8 (explaining
1999]
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took significant steps toward state regulation of the location of future
development.16
Still other states have taken similar steps since the publication of
Bosselman and Callies's compilation, creating a "second generation" of the
Quiet Revolution. For instance, since 1972 Florida has extensively regulated
large developments deemed to have regional, as opposed to merely local,
impact.17 New York exercises substantial direct control and other forms of
supervision over the many private lands in its Adirondack State Park, an area
the size of Vermont.18 Finally, upon the adoption of its 1973 Land Use Act,
Oregon assumed land-use powers even more sweeping than those of the state
government of Hawaii. 19
Such state policies marked a significant shift away from states' prior
noninvolvement in land-use regulation. They also raise legitimate and
substantial questions about a heretofore unspoken premise of this Note: that it
is reasonable to compare land-use regimes at the national, rather than the
local, level. If Oregon and Hawaii can formulate comprehensive state laws to
regulate urban development in accordance with a restrictive model of compact
urban development, and if Vermont can make serious efforts to preserve its
how the Hawaiian land-use law works).
16. The Maine Land Use Regulation Commission directly administers the controls over land
use in unincorporated areas. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 683 (West 1994). Even incorporated
communities must adhere to statewide "standards," broad policy guidelines prepared by the
Commission. See id. §§ 685-A(3), -A(4). Vermont, proud of its rural beauty and small-town traditions
and mindful of their value in attracting tourism, attempts to channel growth into existing town centers
designated as "growth areas" in order to protect mixed-use, compact-settlement urban patterns. See
Vermont Planning and Development Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 4301-4348 (1992). The state has
made the availability of certain state funds to municipalities contingent upon the designation of such
growth centers. See id. § 4306. For a mixed assessment of the success of the "growth center" policy in
maintaining traditional compact village form in Vermont in the face of the pressures of rapid economic
development, see Jessica E. Jay, Note, The "Mailing" of Vermont: Can the "Growth Center"
Designation Save the Traditional Village from Suburban Sprawl?, 21 VT. L. REV. 929, 961-63 (1997)
(demonstrating that even a state as rural as Vermont can be dramatically affected by the land-use trends
of the more metropolitan parts of the country, such as the tendency to develop new commercial
establishments along highways rather than in traditional town centers).
17. See Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
380.06 (West 1987); see also FRANK J. POPPER, THE POLmCS OF LAND-UsE REFORM 78 (1981)
(explaining the provisions of the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act).
18. See Adirondack Park Agency Act, 27 N.Y. EXEc. LAW §§ 800-820 (Consol. 1995); see
also POPPER, supra note 17, at 81 (explaining the provisions of the Adirondack Park Agency Act).
19. By this act Oregon became the first state to require all municipal governments to prepare
comprehensive plans of development and to submit these plans to a state agency for approval
("acknowledgment"). See Oregon Land Use Act, ch. 80, 1973 Or. Laws 127 (codified as amended at
OR. REv. STAT. § 197 (1997)); see also GERRIT KNAAP & ARTHUR C. NELSON, THE REGULATED
LANDSCAPE: LESSONS ON STATE LAND USE PLANNING FROM OREGON 22-23 (1992) (summarizing the
main provisions of the Oregon Land Use Act). As a result, by 1985 Oregon could claim that, uniquely
among American jurisdictions, "every acre of Oregon land is zoned, every zone is planned, and every
plan is state-approved." KNAAP & NELSON, supra, at 1. Moreover, Oregon consciously set out to
constrain the physical extension of its metropolitan areas, principally Portland, through the regulatory
device of "urban growth boundaries" beyond which most development would not be permitted. See id.
at 51-53. While Oregon's comprehensive state law finds no parallel in the United States, it resembles
German and Swiss policies discussed in Section nI.B.
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landscape of small nucleated villages from the encroachment of Wal-Mart
stores and suburban-style subdivisions, then how meaningful is it to discuss
"national" land-use regimes and (as I shall do below) "national" ideologies?
There are a number of answers to this question.
First, while some degree of state regulation of land use has become
entrenched since the Quiet Revolution, the more ambitious programs of
Hawaii, Vermont, and Oregon are still highly exceptional, as is the
commitment to a more regimented ordering of the built environment that the
policies presumably reveal.2 0 Accordingly, while the more far-reaching Quiet
Revolution projects certainly need to be noted-and deserve scholarly
attention as interesting examples of dissent from prevailing national norms-
they do not disprove certain generalizations about land-use controls at the
national level. The role of state land-use laws remains relatively minor as
compared to local regulation (particularly, as will be argued below, in contrast
with Germany and Switzerland21).
A further reason why comparisons at the national level are valuable is
that land-use regulation in the United States has an explicitly federal
component, which by definition is uniform across the states.
Contemporaneous with the Quiet Revolution at the state level, the blossoming
of the environmental movement in the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the passage
of federal legislation with ramifications for land-use regulation. Such federal
laws show that Congress has at least recognized the environmental
significance of land-use decisions. In the optimistic view of the early 1970s,
these acts gave hope that Congress would ultimately articulate a national
20. "Mhe legislation of most states continues to reflect an underlying assumption that the
control of land use is basically a local problem." 4 ANDERSON'S, supra note 9, § 24.01.
21. See infra Section II.B.
22. Following the passage of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-583, 86 Stat 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1994)), many states (most
notably California) have also resorted to statewide regulation to protect their coastlines from
unorganized, unattractive, or simply excessive development. See POPPER, supra note 17, at 84
(analyzing various state approaches to land-use planning). In addition, the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-4347 (1994)), required federal agencies to conform to environmental standards. Specifically,
NEPA required federal agencies to prepare "environmental impact statements" concerning the likely
consequences of proposed federal activity. Other federal legislation relevant to land-use concerns
includes the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, § 7, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7401 (1994)), and its 1970 amendments, which directed the Environmental Protection Agency
to review the environmental impact of much federal activity. See Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12a, 84 Stat.
1709 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (1994)). Similarly, the Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)), created
national standards for certain kinds of industrial emissions and provides for federal enforcement. As a
result of various revisions and augmentations over the years, this law also involved the federal
government extensively in the funding, location, and sizing of new sewer lines and sewage treatment
plants, decisions that powerfully influence the location of new' development. See David L. Callies, The
Quiet Revolution Revisited, 46 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 135, 140 (1980). In addition, the 1970 Federal-Aid
Highway Act, Pub. L. No. 91-605, 84 Stat. 1734 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 109j) (1994)),
along with other federal laws, required submission of transportation plans considering environmental
effects when communities build new roads. Finally, the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87
Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1994)), restricted development potentially
threatening the habitat of a protected species.
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policy on land-use regulation addressing some of the problems associated with
disorganized and chaotic development. 3
Ultimately, however, the Quiet Revolution failed to achieve an explicit
national policy against the uncoordinated development of land that
characterized, and continues to characterize, the United States.24 Indeed, after
the mid-1970s, the movement for increased state and federal regulation of
land use foundered as it began to encounter conservative political
opposition. 5 To be sure, there has been no return to the days before
environmental concerns pushed their way to the top of the national agenda and
galvanized the federal and state governments into action.26 Indeed, there even
have been some new additions to the ranks of the "revolutionary" states that
have added a layer of state coordination to their land-use regimes.
Nevertheless, despite the creation of new layers of federal and state
regulation, there has been no adoption of a national policy and, with the few
exceptions already named, no state legislation against uncoordinated sprawl or
in favor of the compact city development that, I will argue, characterizes
Germany and Switzerland.28
The other key feature of the American regime that distinguishes it from
its German and Swiss counterparts-and that justifies a national-level
comparison-is America's reliance on municipal zoning as the preeminent
tool of metropolitan land-use regulation. Western European observers are
frequently perplexed by the fact that zoning appears to exist in the absence of
highly developed national (or even state) policies on land-use planning.29 To
be sure, planning is not absent from the American scene. Indeed, the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act3 0-the product of a commission appointed by then-
23. See Russell E. Train, Foreword to BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 12, at ii (calling
land use "the most important environmental issue remaining substantially unaddressed as a matter of
national policy"). Train was the chairman of President Richard Nixon's Council on Environmental
Quality, so his support for such a national policy suggests that political receptiveness to it in the early
1970s was not limited to liberals.
24. Federal legislation that would have established a national policy in favor of statewide
land-use planning of major infrastructural development, supported by federal grants, was repeatedly
introduced into Congress during the 1970s but never became law. For details of this story, see POPPER,
supra note 17, at 60.
25. See id. at 209.
26. See Callies, supra note 22, at 140. Popper suggests that single-issue regulation, such as
protection of coastal areas, has retained more state legislative support than general statewide regulation
of all building. See POPPER, supra note 17, at 229.
27. See David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: A Quarter Century of Progress, 26
URB. LAW. 197, 205-11 (1994) (mentioning Georgia, New Jersey, Washington, Rhode Island, and
Maryland).
28. See Reid Ewing, Is LosAngeles-Style Sprawl Desirable?, 63 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 107, 118
(1997) (calling for "active planning of the type practiced almost everywhere except the United States
(and beginning to appear here out of necessity)").
29. Thus, a British scholar writes that "the lack of any substantial relationship between the
legal machinery and a clear concept of city planning is the firmest impression left by the origin and later
course of land-use control in America." JOHN DELAFONS, LAND-USE CONTROLS IN TE UNITED STATES
24(1969).
30. ADvIsoRY COMM. ON ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING
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Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, and still the basic source of zoning
power in most states-calls for zoning regulations to be "made in accordance
with a comprehensive plan.
3 1
Yet the early and continuing tendency among American courts has been
to hold that this requirement is met merely by demonstrating the existence of a
zoning law itself, as the putative end product of a planning process. In most
jurisdictions, no separate plan for the town's development has usually been
required to uphold a zoning law.32 In addition, such land-use planning remains
largely restricted to the local municipal, or at most the regional metropolitan,
level. State enabling acts typically provide for weak regional planning
boards; frequently, municipalities can simply refuse to participate in these
boards.34 Moreover, the enabling acts usually specify that the plans drawn up
by these boards are to be advisory rather than legally binding.35 In short,
American land-use planning is weak and usually optional.
2. The U.S. Regime: Goals
American land-use law's reliance on zoning and the weakness of
statutory urban planning can be understood relatively easily by reference to
goals made explicit within zoning jurisprudence itself. Zoning in the United
States has focused on one central objective: the separation of residential uses
from others, and, within the broader category of residential uses, the
separation of single-family homes from other kinds of living accommodations.
Zoning accomplishes this goal admirably even without extensive city
planning. As will be argued, American zoning law represents a rejection of
urbanity and of the city in favor of a certain vision of private domestic life.
Zoning developed as a statutory tool intended to protect favored uses
and households from disfavored ones.36 This phenomenon can be traced back
ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926).
31. Id. § 3.
32. See Dawson Enters., Inc. v. Blaine County, 567 P.2d 1257 (Idaho 1977); Kozesnik v.
Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957); Bell v. City of Elkhom, 364 N.W.2d 144 (Wis.
1985). Even in California, a relatively aggressive Quiet Revolution state that does require
comprehensive planning, the state government possesses "no enforcement mechanism to compel
localities to comply with their own plans. For jurisdictions grossly out of compliance, the state must rely
on individuals to sue the locality in court in order to force the adoption of a legally-adequate general
plan for development." John A. Hird et al., Housing in San Francisco: Shelter in the Market Economy,
in HOUSING MARKETS AND HOUSING INSTITUTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 157, 197 (Biorn
Harsman & John M. Quigley eds., 1991). On the other hand, where municipalities do have
comprehensive plans in effect, a growing number of jurisdictions are inclined to treat such plans either
as useful statements of public policy or even as binding laws that necessarily constrain all zoning
ordinances enacted by the municipality. See Edward J. Sullivan, The Plan as Law, 26 URB. LAW. 753
(1994) (reviewing the extent to which various states give legal force to municipal plans).
33. See PETER HALL, URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING 205 (3d ed. 1992) (calling U.S.
planning "excessively local and small-scale").
34. See 4 ANDERSON'S, supra note 9, § 24.04.
35. See id. § 24.12.
36. Indeed, zoning developed as a statutory substitute for the common law doctrine of
nuisance, which was the universal remedy against noxious uses of land in the United States until early in
this century. See lid. § 3.02-.03. New York City's 1916 zoning ordinance was the first of its kind in the
country. See id. § 3.07.
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as far as the foundational Euclid 37 case, in which the Supreme Court gave its
imprimatur to zoning by holding that the practice falls within the state's
"police power."38 In its decision, the Euclid Court describes as the "crux" of
zoning legislation "the creation and maintenance of residential districts, from
which business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment
houses, are excluded. ' 39 To this day, American zoning is still based on a
model of a "hierarchy" of uses, with single-family residences as the highest
use, followed by multiple-family residences, commerce, light industry, and so
forth. 40 And "single-family dwellings were, and they continue to be, regarded
as meriting the most stringent protection.
'
This zealous protection of single-family residences from lower uses is
captured by a Supreme Court decision from twenty-five years ago, Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas,42 which makes clear that what American courts since
Euclid have sought to protect through zoning is a certain kind of
neighborhood:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs.. .The police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to
lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.4 3
The Belle Terre decision expresses a conception of the good community
whose central feature is private domesticity and in which other uses figure as
threats. What accounts for this insistence on domesticity and the relative
absence of federal and state land-use policies? It will turn out in Part HI that
the answer to this question is closely linked to the radical attack on the
prestige and autonomy of American cities in U.S. public law. But first we turn
to a brief exploration of the land-use regimes to which that of the United
States is being compared.
B. Land-Use Regimes in Germany and Switzerland
German and Swiss land-use regimes diverge from the American model
along every dimension that was explored above. Fundamentally, they stem not
from a glorification of private life, as in the United States, but rather from a
subordination of private life and private property to a certain model of the
normatively desirable community. The German and Swiss regimes give
government full control over the location and extent of future development.
37. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
38. Id. at 389-90.
39. Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
40. See2 ANDERSON'S, supra note 9, § 9.14.
41. Id.
42. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding the constitutionality of a village zoning ordinance
prohibiting occupancy of a dwelling by more than two unrelated persons).
43. Id. at 9.
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And government employs this power so as to preserve the hegemony of
important towns over their surrounding smaller towns, villages, and
countryside.
In addition, the German and Swiss systems share a common structure
involving all levels of administration: a federal government that frames the
broad outlines of land-use policy and identifies the objectives of land-use
controls; German states (Liinder; singular, Land) and Swiss cantons that
provide relatively detailed plans for the use of the territory under their
jurisdiction; and, finally, regional and local administration of these plans,
including zoning and direct control over individual land parcels. In both
countries the basic system of land-use controls is laid out in a federal law.
1. The Land-Use Regime of Germany
Thus, in Germany, the federal Bundesraumordnungsgesetz (Federal
Land-Use Law, hereinafter BROG)" sets out the goals of land-use regulation
and the means of their implementation in a general and nonhierarchical
manner. The BROG requires each German Land to formulate a program and
comprehensive plans for its own territory.45 This state-level planning
(Landesplanung) is intended to produce a development program
(Landesentwicklungsprogramm) with a lifespan of about fifteen years. This
program divides the territory of the state into regions; for example, the
relatively large German Land of Bavaria is divided into eighteen planning
regions.46 Within each of these regions the government assigns a particular
status to the various cities, towns, and villages within the state, based on their
size and importance.
47
These designations do not simply describe a particular settlement; rather
they prescribe a particular status for it. The designations reflect the so-called
"central cities" approach prescribed by the BROG, which is derived from the
work of German planners in the 1930s.48 These planners believed that "a
community is interwoven with the surrounding area for which the community
provides the source of services and facilities." 49 Under the influence of this
principle, the Lander, as part of their activities under'the BROG, have usually
chosen to categorize all settlements as main, middle, or subordinate centers, or
as non-centers.
5 0
44. Bundesraumordnungsgesetz (BROG), v. 8.4.1965 (BGB1. I S.306), amended by Law of
May 6, 1993, v. 6.5.1993 (BGB1. I 8.630).
45. See id. § 3(2).
46. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Planning and Land Development Law in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 54 TuL. L. REv. 624, 627-28 (1980) (citing Landesentwicklungsprogramm
Bayern, Teil A, 31 (1976)).
47. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 628 (citing Bayerisches Landesplanungsgesetz,
art. 13, v. 6.2.1970 (GVB1. Bayern S.65), amended by Law of July 24, 1970, v. 24.7.1974. (GVBI.
Bayem S.354)).
48. See Clifford Larsen, What Should Be the Leading Principles of Land Use Planning? A
German Perspective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 967, 1006 (1996).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1006-08.
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-What turns on this distinction is the right to future development of the
center (or non-center):
[Main centers] are intended to offer a full range of educational and cultural opportunities,
health care, housing, shopping, and economic opportunity. Other categories of centers
will only be allowed to offer jobs and services to accommodate the needs of the
surrounding population. Communities that are not designated as centers will typically
receive only minimal public investment funds and will not be allowed to grow beyond
replacement of existing housing stock.51
In other words, the location of development is ultimately determined by the
Land, in conformity with national policy.
In addition, restrictions on development cannot be evaded by moving out
of town altogether, as they can be in the United States. To begin, in contrast to
the United States, nearly all German land lies within the territory of a
municipality.52 This means that it is not possible, as it is in the United States,
for a developer to evade the zoning plan of a municipality by relocating her
building activities a mile or two beyond the city limit. More fundamentally,
the use of nonurban (i.e., primarily agricultural) land, which has received the
legal designation of Aussenbereich, or "outside area," is regulated with great
strictness in Germany. Under German law, building on such land is essentially
limited to construction ancillary to agricultural activities. 53 In short, in
Germany there is no escape from regional land-use regulation and national
land-use policy.
Finally, in further contrast to the United States, the power of the federal
government and Ldnder also extends to the control of land-use regulation
enacted by local government. Under the German Federal Building Code, each
municipality is required to draw up zoning plans (Flichennutzungspliine) and,
at the most detailed level, building plans (Bebauungspliine), that regulate
individual subdivisions.54 These plans are subject to higher-level review. For
example, the Land of Schleswig-Holstein reviews "[local] development plans,
which are drafted for a period of five years, and may disapprove the plans if
they do not meet federal and state planning goals." 55 Thus, Germany's land-
use regime is both more hierarchical and more comprehensive than
America's. Do Germans tolerate these restraints on the use of private property
because they are more left-wing than Americans, as evidenced by Germany's
51. Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 628 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
52. See ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 40-41
(1986).
53. See Baugesetzbuch [Federal Building Code], v. 12.12.1986 (BGBI. I S.2253) [hereinafter
German Federal Building Code]; see also Terence J. Centner, Preserving Rural-Urban Fringe Areas
and Enhancing the Rural Environment: Looking at Selected German Institutional Responses, 11 ARIz. J.
INT'L & COMe. L. 27, 31 (1994) (citing German Federal Building Code).
54. See German Federal Building Code § 1(3); see also Larsen, supra note 48, at 979 (citing
German Federal Building Code).
55. Larsen, supra note 48, at 1005 (citing Gesetz fiber die Landesplanung
(Landesplanungsgesetz), art. 13, para. 4, v. 10.6.1992 (GVBI. Schleswig-Holstein S.342) and
subsequent amendments).
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strong labor unions and historically Marxist left? No. Rather, German land-
use controls represent a consensus on what constitutes the model of the good
urban life.56 This model is embraced not just by the concededly rather social
democratic Germans, but by their decidedly free-market neighbors, the
Swiss.
5 7
2. The Land-Use Regime of Switzerland
The Swiss Federation's power to implement a national land-use policy is
derived from a constitutional amendment adopted only as recently as 1967.58.
By this amendment the Swiss federal government was empowered to enact
legislation to establish basic principles with respect to the development and
settlement of the nation and the use of land, and in particular the creation of
zoning regulations by the cantons. 59 Under the constitution, the federation is
also authorized to promote and coordinate the land-use regulation activities of
the cantons.60 As can be readily observed, this range of powers corresponds
closely to that exercised by the federal government of Germany.
On the strength of this new constitutional provision, the Swiss
government later enacted land-use legislation, known as the Bundesgesetz
fiber die Raumplanung (PG) of 1979.61 Like the German BROG, the RPG
establishes general rules to which all levels of government must adhere. In
addition, the RPG allocates responsibilities among different levels of
government. Thus, the federation's duties include consultation with the
cantons, regular reporting on the current land-use situation, and (more
substantially) the elaboration of certain Sachpldne, plans over specific policy
areas.
62
As to the cantons, the RPG directs them to produce development
programs (Richtpliine), similar to those of the German Lainder, in which the
cantons are to report on the current condition and development of population,
traffic, and so forth.63 The cantons must specify the time framework for the
implementation of their program, 4 and the Richtpldne are also to be
reexamined and, if necessary, reworked every ten years. 65 The cantons must
56. See infra Section III.A.
57. On Switzerland's strong commitment to capitalist economic institutions, see generally
PETER I. KATZENSTEIN, CORPORATISM AND CHANGE: AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND THE POLITICS OF
INDUSTRY (1984). Katzenstein describes "Switzerland's traditional preference that the government
should play a minor role in the economy," id. at 107, and the country's small federal bureaucracy
compared to other OECD countries, see id. at 116.
58. See BUNDESVERFASSUNG [Constitution] [3V] arts. 22-ter, 22-quater (Switz.), amended by
Law of Sept. 1, 1967 (BBI 1967 II 133). Significantly, this development was approximately
contemporaneous with the adoption of the German BROG. As will be argued in Part III, both
represented a response to the effects of post-World War II prosperity.
59. See Id. art. 22-quater.
60. See id.
61. Bundesgesetz Uiber die Raumplanung [RPG], AS 1979 1573 (1979).
62. See id. art. 13.
63. See id. arts. 6, 8a.
64. See id. art. 8b.
65. See id. art. 9, para. 3.
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also designate which areas are most suitable for agriculture or are deserving of
protection because of their beauty, cultural significance, or susceptibility to
environmental problems.66 In addition, the cantons are directed to produce
more specific use plans, or Nutzungspliine, which actually carve up their
territory into several different use zones; these plans are normally drawn up by
the communes (i.e., municipalities) on the orders of the cantonal governments.
The main use zones are the building zones (Bauzonen), the agricultural zones
(Landwirtschaftszonen), and the conservation zones (Schutzzonen).67
Because it prohibits urbanization of agricultural zones, the RPG ensures
that agricultural land is protected, while land available for development is
contained and monopolized by existing centers. In addition, the RPG specifies
that building zones can encompass only land that is already developed or
whose necessary development is foreseeable within a span of fifteen years.
68
Thus, it becomes clear that it is new development that the RPG views as the
proper object of restraint and suspicion.
As for the cantons, they use their land-use powers in accordance with the
same broad goals as those underlying the RPG. For example, the 1985
Baugesetz (Building and Planning Code)69 of the canton of Bern provides a
useful illustration of the actual implementation of the national policy on the
cantonal level.
Within the canton of Bern, planning and zoning responsibilities are
meticulously divided and coordinated among different levels of government.
Thus, the cantonal administration itself is responsible for the publication of
reports on land use,70 for the delineation of agricultural land,71 for the
establishment of cantonal development plans when the communes or the
regions fail to safeguard interests broader than their own,72 and for the
development plans required by the RPG.73
Below the cantonal level, the regions and communes of the canton of
Bern also play an important role in land-use regulation. These "regions" are
groups of communes agglomerated for the purposes of land-use control. As
Zaugg explains, "The region in the sense of land-use planning law is a space
that is characterized and limited by 4eographic features ... and by economic
relationships and interdependence." The regions are responsible for land-use
regulation tasks that require coordination among the member communes.75
66. See id. art. 6, para. 2.
67. See id. arts. 15-17.
68. See id. art. 15b.
69. Baugesetz des Kantons Bern (BauG Bern), v. 9.6.1985, reprinted in ALDO ZAUGO,
KOMMENTAR ZUM BAUGESETZ DES KANTONS BERN VOM 9. JUNI 1985 (1995).
70. See BauG Bern, art. 100, para. 4, reprinted in ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 539.
71. See BauG Bern, art. 101, para. 2, reprinted in ZAuGG, supra note 69, at 540.
72. See BauG Bern, art. 102, para. 2, reprinted in ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 544.
73. See BauG Bern, arL 103, para. 1, reprinted in ZAUGG, supra note 69 at 546.
74. ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 528 (author's translation).
75. See BauG Bern, art. 98, para. 1, reprinted in ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 529.
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They also serve as an intermediate level and liaison between the cantonal
government and the communes.
Finally, at the most local level, the municipalities are bound by the
federal constitution and legislation and by cantonal legislation.76 However, it
is also the communes that actually zone their own territory and regulate
subdivision development and actual buildings. In addition, they are
responsible for supplying authorized developments with public utilities and
roads and for the consolidation of building areas.77 Thus, the example of Bern
demonstrates how Swiss and German land-use law integrates all governmental
bodies into an effort to pursue a national policy. But to what end?
3. The German and Swiss Regimes: Goals
The German and Swiss land-use laws share a number of objectives.
Broadly speaking, the laws are formulated to prevent destabilizing social
change. Swiss and German policies evince a refusal to treat land-use
regulation in the American manner, as essentially a matter of regulating
private property rights; in contrast, Swiss and German laws assume that land-
use regulation is an important way of maintaining the social order.
This broad goal of maintaining social stability is instantiated in more
specific policy objectives. These include the stabilization of small cities'
populations by preventing large-scale migration for economic reasons; the
prevention of sprawl and the preservation of the appearance of both cities and
countryside; and the promotion of commercial agriculture and especially
family farmers. Let us consider these concerns in turn, using examples drawn
from both Germany and Switzerland.
First, by closing off the overwhelming mass of agricultural land to
development through the legal categories of Aussenbereich in Germany78 and
Landwirtschaftszone in Switzerland, 79 existing cities' in effect receive a
monopoly of most nonagricultural economic activity, and population growth
is directed to existing centers. The designation of towns as "centers" of
different ranks, or as non-centers, also serves this goal. That is, by restricting
development in minor centers and non-centers, German policy discourages
people from moving to areas where, by definition, housing, jobs, and services
will not be provided. Like the strict controls on building in the Aussenbereich
and in the Landwirtschaftszonen, the policy of "center" designation thus
appears to stem from a desire to limit internal migration and keep people
where they already are.
Some support for this characterization of the goals of German land-use
policy can be found in recent German history. The policy of using land-use
controls to contain internal movement was born as a result of a substantial
increase in migration during the early post-World War II years, when areas of
76. See ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 399.
77. See BauG Bern, art. 64, reprinted in ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 406-O1.
78. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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the Federal Republic near the inter-German border began to suffer economic
decline after being cut off from their traditional markets that were now located
in the German Democratic Republic. 80 In consequence, land-use controls, in
conjunction with various forms of federal aid to depressed areas, have come to
be viewed as an important means of preventing "massive population
movements causing the under-utilization and decay of older infrastructure and
a concomitant increase in demand for new infrastructure."
81
Second, Swiss and German concern is not just with migration of persons
between cities; it is also with migration of persons, and businesses, from
towns into the hinterland. An important principle of the BROG requires the
territory of Germany to be developed so as to construct "a balanced
relationship between populated areas and rural space." 82 Stripped of the
pleasing rhetoric, this policy means that existing downtowns receive a
monopoly of most economic functions in order to prevent development from
spilling out into the countryside. Again, the goal can be described at its
highest level of generality as preservation of the traditional compact city.
Swiss law also uses national policy to preserve urban cores. For
example, Bernese law discourages the development of large shopping centers
outside existing downtowns by requiring municipal authorization and
supervision of any such projects.83 This prohibition is unapologetically
intended, in part, to protect such downtowns from competition.84 The Bemese
model of city development calls for "decentralization of settlement and
economy, in other words, the preservation of numerous viable population
centers. It is worth noting in this context that U.S. courts have frequently
been confronted with the anti-competitive implications of comprehensive
plans designed to protect downtown merchants. 86 While such plans have
generally withstood litigation, the fact that the issue is raised at all indicates
how controversial and sometimes offensive downtown-protection can seem in
an American legal context.
80. See Larsen, supra note 48, at 977.
81. Id. at 972.
82. Bundesraumordnungsgesetz (BROG) § 2(l)(1), v. 8.4.1965 (BGBI. I S.306), amended by
Law of May 6, 1993, v. 6.5.1993 (BGBI. I S.630).
83. See Baugesetz des Kantons Bern (BauG Bern), arts. 19-20, v. 9.6.1985, reprinted in
ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 180-82.
84. See ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 191, 358 (noting that Bernese legislation is intended to
prevent shopping centers from sapping the vitality of existing downtowns and neighborhood shopping
areas (Orts- und Quartierzentren) and interfering with the ability of less mobile people to take care of
their shopping needs conveniently); see also id. at 358 ("The restraints on shopping centers in peripheral
locations. .. are to prevent the existing supply network (Versorgungnsnetz) from being endangered by
the formation ofa new center (Zentrumsbildung) on the edge of town." (author's translation)).
85. Id. at 359.
86. See, e.g., Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Hailey, 903 P.2d 741, 749 (Idaho
1995) (holding that "preserving aesthetic values and the economic viability of a community's downtown
business core can be a proper zoning purpose" even where the result is to protect downtown merchants
from competition).
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In Switzerland, it appears, the legal community takes a different view of
this issue. Zaugg writes that "[R]estrictions on trade and commerce are
permissible when based on regulatory grounds (polizeilichen Griinden), on
considerations of social policy, and on measures undertaken by the cantons in
the immediate context of land-use planning."87 Thus, the goal of providing the
cheapest prices to consumers at the point of purchase is implicitly
subordinated to the goals of land-use planning.
The Swiss also use numerous other policies to favor high-density
settlements. To begin, development is supposed to take into account the need
for providing public transport. Bernese law thus requires the provision of
public transit to small towns, so that people who do not live within walking
distance of a train station will have access to a bus line. 8 In addition, Swiss
towns are intended to remain attractive and accessible to pedestrians. The law
requires that towns be provided with bicycle and pedestrian paths,8 9 trees, and
green spaces. 90 Such provisions aim to make the dense settlement pattern
called for by Swiss law seem desirable rather than burdensome.
The corollary of this policy of entrenching towns is draconian
restrictions on the development of the countryside. Accordingly, Bernese law
contains guidelines that preserve land for agricultural use and try to maintain
the attractiveness of the landscape. Small building zones are avoided, as they
tend to lead to destruction of the countryside.91 In addition, remarkably, all
building zones are to be separated by "green" zones (which cannot be
developed) so as to prevent the "excessive agglomeration of built-up areas"
("die flbermeissige Zusammenballung ilberbauter Gebiete").9 - This ensures
that Swiss towns and villages maintain their separate physical identity.
Clearly, regulating the appearance of the landscape is an important goal of
Swiss and German policy.
This goal of preserving a pristine countryside is linked with a strong
policy of favoring peasant agriculture. In Germany, according to the BROG,
agriculture is to remain a "peasant-structured and efficient sector" ("biuerlich
strukturierter, leistungsfdhiger Wirtschaftszweig").93 The vision of agriculture
in the BROG is thus one of family farms that primarily grow crops and raise
small numbers of livestock.94 Such farms are also favored with generous tax
provisions, including subsidies that "may be responsible for nearly one-half of
a farm's profit and income potential. ' 95 To be sure, farmers' political
87. ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 38 (author's translation).
88. See BauG Bern, art. 74, para. 1, reprinted in ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 438; ZAUGO, supra
note 69, at 442; see also Bundesgesetz fiber die Raumplanung [RPG], art. 3, par. 3(a), AS 1979 1573
(1979) (requiring that residences and workplaces be situated so as to be easily accessible to each other
by public transit).
89. See RPG, art. 3, para. 3(c).
90. See RPG, art. 3, para. 3(e).
91. See ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 443.
92. BauG Bern, art. 79, para. 1, reprinted in ZAUGG, supra note 69, at 462.
93. Bundesraumordnungsgesetz (BROG) § 2(7), v. 8.4.1965 (BGBI. I S.306), amended by
Law of May 6, 1993, v. 6.5.1993 (BGBI. I S.630).
94. See Centner, supra note 53, at 32.
95. Id.
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influence should not be discounted as an important part of the explanation for
these subsidies. What is important for this Note, however, is the relation
between the policy of restricting development of agricultural areas and the
policy of subsidizing family farms. Arguably, both can be seen as means to
the same broad objective: preserving the rural landscape and traditional social
structure. Under such a reading of these policies, family farms are important
to European governments as custodians of regional landscapes, and it is at
least in part this social role that gives farmers the moral authority to demand
subsidization.
96
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the protection of the countryside
and the protection of downtowns are necessarily linked. Thus, in Switzerland,
the decline of the family farm has provoked increased pressure on the Swiss
government to permit more placement of residences and businesses in
agricultural areas.97 Martin Lendi, a prominent planner, has vehemently
rejected these proposals, asserting that such liberalization would "pull the
ground out from under" ("den Boden unter den Fiissen wegziehen")
businesses and housing already located in the cities.
98
In summary, it may be helpful to ask what goals are not featured in
German and Swiss land-use regimes that do figure in U.S. land-use regulation.
Clearly absent from German and Swiss regulation is the American goal of
segregating single-family homes from other uses. The most restrictive German
zones call for duplexes and convenience shops alongside single-family homes,
and German law does not require segregation of many services and clean
(nonindustrial) workplaces from residential areas. 99 On the contrary, the
emphasis placed in both Germany and Switzerland on provision to all
populated areas of public transport and pedestrian and bicycle paths, together
with the insistence on nucleated settlements centering on comprehensive retail
96. Thus, to the chagrin of the United States, the 15 European Union countries have spent
approximately $2 billion to subsidize the practice of "agrotourism," in which otherwise unviable farms
stay in business by accepting paying holiday guests who wish to spend time in a rural setting. "A
populated countryside... [European ofecials say] protects picturesque landscapes that attract tourists
and produces distinctive products, like wines and cheeses, that swell European food exports." John
Tagliabue, Preserving a Heritage via Bed and Barns: European Governments Subsidize Agrotourism,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 13, 1998, at Dl. For a European perspective on the role of the peasant farmer in the
preservation of the rural landscape, see Georges Thomson, La Communautd europdenne et le paysage
[The European Community and the Landscape], 4 REVUE JURIDIQUE DE L'EMNVRONNEMENr 541, 563
(1993) (arguing that the very idea of a "landscape" ("paysage") denotes "a humanized nature, that is one
that is mastered, controlled by work, and in which the traces of human activity are visible" (author's
translation)). The same author suggests that the peasantry is the "ideal workforce" for the maintenance
of many elements of the landscape associated with traditional agriculture. See id. at 564.
97. See Ulrich Zimmerli, Bauen ausserhalb von Bauzonen: Anmerkungen zur Revision des
Raumplanungsgesetzes [Building Outside the Building Zones: Notes on the Revision of the RPG], 4
BEiBLATr BAURECHT/DROIT DE LA CONSTRUCION 107, 108 (1997) (noting that the number of Swiss
farms dropped from approximately 120,000 to approximately 80,000 between 1985 and 1997).
98. Martin Lendi, Langfristige Verantwortung wider kurzfristige Bedirfnisse: Viom Sinn und
Zweck der Raumplanung [Long-Term Responsibility Versus Short-Term Needs: On the Meaning and
Goal of Land-Use Planning], NEUE ZORCHER ZEnrUNG, Mar. 14-15, 1998, at 83.
99. See Thomas H. Logan, The Americanization of German Zoning, 42 J. AM. INST.
PLANNERS 377, 383-84 (1976).
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districts, suggests the opposite: the desire to force people to live relatively
near work and shopping, and to encourage citizens to use public transportation
to reach these destinations.
How effective have German and Swiss land-use policies been in
achieving their ends? On the one hand, German and Swiss policies appear to
have had some success in meeting their stated objectives of preserving the
compact city. The beauty of the German landscape, free of clutter and
scattered residential development, is one prize of the country's land-use
policies.1° Another achievement is the preservation of vibrant urban cores,
producing a country of livable and prosperous medium-sized cities. 10 1 As a
result, German land-use policies have drawn approbation elsewhere in
Europe.1
0 2
On the other hand, Swiss and German policies should not be
romanticized: They entail serious costs that Americans would probably find
intolerable. As one might expect, because of the scarcity of available land,
"Germany ranks last among western European countries in the percentage of
the population that own their own home." 103 Germany also pays for its
successes with "a high degree of bureaucratic control, loss of local
government control over land-use policy, and severe restrictions on individual
private property rights."'' °4 In addition, the insistence on extremely detailed
public supervision of development has had to be modestly revised in the
former German Democratic Republic in order to deal with urgent housing and
infrastructure problems there.
10 5
Finally, the argument that Germans and Swiss (and more broadly,
Europeans) are committed to containing metropolitan growth does not mean
that there are no large-and sprawling!-metropolises in Europe. Indeed,
there is much evidence that trends in Europe and elsewhere in the developing
world to some extent mirror those in the United States toward greater
100. See Centner, supra note 53, at 38.
101. See Larsen, supra note 48, at 1011.
102. For example, Jean-Louis Guigou, a French planning official, in response to a study
reporting on the continuing growth of metropolitan Paris, has urged the French to follow the German
model of a cluster of medium-sized cities. "They have rejected the city of 10 million inhabitants in favor
of about 10 cities with less than a million people, each one having its specialty." Jean-Louis Guigou
defend le centre-ville: Le responsable de la Datar d6nounce le module americain [Jean-Louis Guigou
Defends Downtown: Official in Charge of Datar Denounces the American Model], LE FIGARO (Paris),
Aug. 20, 1998, at 7 (author's translation). Datar is the French government agency for regional planning
and development.
103. Larsen, supra note 48, at 1018. Americans, perhaps not coincidentally, are quite well-
housed by international standards. A recent international study notes that the U.S. housing stock
compares favorably with European countries on some dimensions of housing well-being, such as degree
of crowding, supply of central heating, and presence of complete plumbing. See Bjorn Harsman & John
M. Quigley, Housing Markets and Housing Institutions in a Comparative Context, in HousiNG
MARKETS AND HOUSING INSTITUTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON, supra note 32, at 1, 20-21.
104. Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 656.
105. For instance, under a procedure known as a Vorhaben-und-Erschliessungsplan (Project
and Development Plan), development before the adoption of a Bebauungsplan may proceed if the
developer "guarantees to prepare a local plan [for the project] and finance and implement the servicing
of the development." NEWMAN & THORNLEY, supra note 2, at 61-62; see also id. at 103 (describing the
use of the Vorhaben-und-Erschliessungsplan to accelerate the planning process).
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suburbanization of metropolitan populations and greater reliance on the
automobile.10 6 But what is important to observe, and what this Note has tried
to demonstrate, is that public policy in Europe has not endorsed these trends,
and has had some success in containing them.
In conclusion, to restate national objectives at the highest level of
generality, the American policy of separating putatively incompatible uses
can be contrasted with the German and Swiss policy of combining uses that
are understood to complement each other. Such a policy might be called one
of urban compression. In Part III, historical analysis of the development of the
public law concept of the city is used to explain these fundamental differences
between the American and the German-Swiss approaches to land-use
regulation.
III. PUBLIC LAW CONCEPTIONS OF THE CITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LAND-USE REGIMES
This Part will argue that the development of national land-use regimes
cannot be separated from the development of national public law conceptions
of the city. In German and Swiss legal thought the city has been formulated as
a restrictive and regulatory community that shapes and monitors its residents.
Moreover, German and Swiss cities are also understood as corporate political
entities that serve as building blocks of national society and the national
political order. However, this paradigm of the city, which pervades and
determines German and Swiss land-use controls, is profoundly foreign to
contemporary American law. The public law history of American cities is one
of hostility to the corporate identity and political and social autonomy of the
city.
A. Germany and Switzerland: The City as a Building Block of Society
Land-use regimes in Germany and Switzerland are bound up with the
two countries' historical inheritance of independent, powerful cities
dominating their immediate hinterlands. Today, in both countries, the broader
polity remains committed to the preservation of this paradigm of cities'
municipal identity and social function.
German and Swiss cities bear the mark of the centuries when Central
Europe was a region of fragmented sovereignty. 10 7 Until the Prussian
monarchy managed to unify Germany under its leadership in the nineteenth
century, the region had never known the dominion of a large centralized state.
106. In the last 30 years large European metropolitan areas such as Paris have experienced a
substantial departure of residents from the central city for the suburbs. See IVAN LIGHT, CITIES IN
WORLD PERSPECTIVE 224 (1983). In addition, until the 1970s' oil crunch forced a reevaluation of energy
policy, western European countries were building highways more rapidly than was the United States.
See id. at 229.
107. See Charles Tilly, Entanglements of European Cities and States, in CITIES AND THE RISE
OF STATES IN EUROPE, A.D. 1000 TO 1800, at 1, 23 (Charles Tilly & Wim P. Blockmans eds., 1994).
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The Holy Roman Empire, the loose constitutional entity that more or less
defined Germany between 800 and 1806, "did not develop a central region
with a great residential capital." 108 Instead, without a single dominant state or
strong central government, much of late medieval and early modem Germany
remained enmeshed in the nexus of the symbiotic but tense relationships
between local princes and a multiplicity of strong, highly autonomous towns
dominating their surrounding countryside as well as smaller towns.109 Swiss
towns also appear to have fit this pattern of small autonomous settlements
with dominated hinterlands.
110
Walker has described how the powerful cities of southern Germany were
locked into perpetual conflict with the other would-be powers in the early
modem period. These autonomous towns, often surrounded by defensive
walls, had both to defend themselves from self-aggrandizing princes and to
impose themselves on restive peasants under their domination.' Relations
with the peasants were fundamental to the identity of the central European
autonomous city. Braudel argues that a dominated agricultural hinterland is
fundamental to the identity of any city:
The town only exists as a town in relation to a form of life lower than its own.... There
is no town, no townlet without its villages, its scrap of rural life attached; no town that
does not impose upon its hinterland the amenities of its market, the use of its shops, its
weights and measures, its moneylenders, its lawyers, even its distractions. It has to
dominate an empire, however tiny, in order to exist.1
12
This claim seems to reflect the reality, at least in Germany and
Switzerland, that the economic importance of the towns was dependent on
their political power. Because the town was dependent on the surrounding
countryside for its food supply, peasants were forced to sell their produce in
town markets. And because guilds wanted a captive market for their goods,
peasants were forbidden to practice crafts and were required to come to town
to shop.113 Market transactions were thus a controlled prerogative of city
power.
German cities' regulatory activity also extended to the detailed
supervision of social mores. Within the towns, guilds formed an elite class,
exerting a ubiquitous influence over their members and mediating between
them and the city government. 114 Even such intimate matters as a guild
member's choice of spouse fell within the scope of regulations designed to
108. Peter Moraw, Cities and Citizenry as Factors of State Formation in the Roman-German
Empire of the Late Middle Ages, in CITIES AND THE RISE OF STATES IN EUROPE, A.D. 1000 TO 1800,
supra note 107, at 100, 103.
109. See id. at 116-22 (describing a variety of strategies employed by cities in Germany to
preserve their power vis-i-vis local princes).
110. See id. at 107 (citing examples of Bern and Zftrich and the cantons surrounding them).
111. See MACK WALKER, GERMAN HOME TowNs: COMMuNiTY, STATE, AND GENERAL
ESTATE, 1648-1871, at 113-19 (1971).
112. FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE STRuCTURES OF ORDINARY LIFE: THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE
481-82 (Sian Reynolds trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1992) (1979).
113. SeeWALKER, supranote 111, at 113-14.
114. See id. at 76 (noting guilds' influence on economic regulation, political organization and
representation, and guardianship of social or domestic standards).
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control the membership of the community.115 In addition, it is worth noting
that construction-which is both the use one makes of one's real property and
the shaping of the community's physical space-was also extensively
regulated by city ordinances, which in some cases had been developing since
the medieval period.
11 6
Thus, the German and Swiss town was not just a geographical
expression. The town and its ordinances represented an essential framework
for social regulation, and the townsman was an "integrated personality"
117
situated within his political community. It is this phenomenon of politically
repressive cities struggling to preserve their charter rights against external
opponents and internal subordinate groups that leads Moraw to argue that
urban freedom was the freedom of feudal privileges, not that of liberal
universality.' Urban citizenship represented membership in a privileged
corporate body within an essentially feudal political framework.119
The model of the autonomous town represents an important part of the
historical explanation for the development of the distinctive German and
Swiss approach to land-use regulation. Although Germany developed a
stronger central government than did Switzerland, political elites in both
countries have consistently shared the vision of the city as a constitutive
community and a building block of the larger nation.
In Switzerland, towns and cantons have remained strong and have never
undergone extreme centralization. Indeed, Moraw claims that the founding
impulse of the Swiss Confederafion was the Swiss refusal during the fifteenth
century to give up a privileged position of autonomy and accept more
centralized rule by the Holy Roman Empire. 120 As a consequence, the
phenomenon of guild-dominated towns ruling over a subject countryside was
particularly prominent in early Switzerland.121 Even when a federal state
finally began to emerge in the mid-nineteenth century, it remained non-
centralized, with the cantons retaining an extensive ability to block the
acquisition of new powers by the federation.12 2 In addition, by long-standing
albeit informal tradition, Swiss municipalities have come to be understood as
the third tier of Swiss federalism, and hold extensive powers of internal self-
government and taxation.1
23
The story of modem Swiss cities and the regulation of land use reflects
115. See id. at 103.
116. See Logan, supra note 99, at 379.
117. WALKER, supra note 111, at 106 (describing the guilds' extensive control over community
morals).
118. See Moraw, supra note 108, at 123.
119. See id. ("Freedom of particular cities and the citizem-y in Germany were movements
within the whole of the 'feudal' world, which in its turn was modified by them.").
120. See id. at 113-14.
121. See id. at 107 (citing Bern and Zflrich as imperial cities ruling over extensive hinterlands).
122. See WoLF LNDER, Swiss DEMOCRACY 42-43 (1994) (noting constitutional restraints on
the power of the federal government).
123. See id. at 50-52.
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this long-standing political tradition of localism. It appears that urban growth
in the nineteenth century, although disruptive, did not produce the huge
explosion in urban population and urban problems that was characteristic of
German industrialization. 124 Rather, post-World War II prosperity, with its
growth in demand for cars and houses, seems to have provided the impetus for
contemporary Swiss cantonal and federal land-use regulation.12S Some Swiss
cantons had already adopted land-use policies before federal regulation
began. 126 Specifically, postwar economic expansion led to a speculative real
estate boom cited in the Swiss federal council's official explanation of the
need for a constitutional amendment to permit federal regulation of land
use.127 Finally, by insisting on the maintenance of existing population centers,
Swiss land-use policy complements other official policies of subsidizing
economic development in small communities that would otherwise suffer
population decline.128 Thus, as in the case of Germany, 129 contemporary Swiss
land-use regulation may be tied to official hostility to internal migration.
If in Switzerland the development of modem land-use controls should be
understood as part of a relatively smooth and unproblematic tradition of city
government, in Germany the history of urban autonomy within the
development of the modem German state is more complex. First, it should be
noted that, even during the later middle ages and the early modem period, the
phenomenon of autonomous cities was more prominent in southwestern
Germany than in other parts of the Holy Roman Empire."' Even in the
southwest, the cities gradually lost power to the territorial principalities
around them as a result of the Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century.
131
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the Kingdom of Prussia began
its rise to the preeminence that would ultimately make it the engine of German
unification, its absolutist administrative model actually featured a high degree
of centralized control and extremely weak cities.
132
124. Cf. Georges Andrey, La qudte d'un Etat national: 1798-1848 [The Quest for a National
State: 1798-1848], in NOUVELLE HISTOIRE DE LA SUISSE ET DES SUISSEs [NEW HISTORY OF
SWrrzERLAND AND THE Swiss PEOPLE] 497, 530-31 (Jean-Claude Favez ed., 2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
NEW HISTORY] (describing changes in construction of Swiss cities over the course of the 19th century).
125. See Peter Gilg & Peter Hablutzel, Une course acelire vers l'avenir: 1945-.. . [An
Accelerated Course Toward the Future: 1945-.. .], in NEW HISTORY, supra note 124, at 771, 800
(describing how the construction of plants, offices, residences, roads, and the like reduces the area
usable for agriculture and denatures formerly intact landscapes).
126. See id. at 801.
127. See Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversanmlung flber die Erglnzung der
Bundesverfassung durch die Artikel 22-ter und 22-quater (Verfassungsrechtliche Ordnuung des
Bodenrechts) [Report of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly on the Amendment of the Federal
Constitution by Articles 22-ter and 22-quater (Constitutional Regulation of Real Property)] (Aug. 15,
1967) (BBI 1967 I 133, 134). It is interesting to note that the concept of"speculation" in this document
seems to involve buying agricultural land for development for nonagricultural purposes-in other
words, non-agricultural use of such land is a misuse.
128. See LINDER, supra note 122, at 61-62.
129. See supra text accompanying note 81.
130. See Moraw, supra note 108, at 115.
131. Seeid. atll6.
132. See WOLFGANG R. KRABBE, DIE DEUTSCHE STADT IM 19. UND 20. JAHRHUNDERT [THE
GERMAN CrT IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES] 12-13 (1989) (contrasting the Prussian
model with the survival of relatively autonomous cities in Wtirttemberg, a region in southwestern
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Ultimately, even the triumphant Prussian state would come to see the
utility of cultivating strong city governments. As early as 1808, the Prussian
official Baron vom Stein reinvigorated municipal governments with his City
Charter Law.1 33 This reform transformed cities into "relatively autonomous,
self-governing units in an otherwise hierarchically governed, absolutist
monarchy." 134 Stein's program featured representative city governments
chosen by a restricted electorate of property owners. Stein saw the city as a
political entity, possessing its own legitimacy, historically prior to (and
constitutive of) the state. 135 Accordingly, he believed that strong city
government would channel this legitimacy to the benefit of the state,
converting city-dwellers from passive subjects to active supporters of the
regime.136 The older model of the autonomous and controlling city thus
became the template for urban policy in modem Germany.
Germany's relatively late but intense Industrial Revolution undermined
existing land-use patterns dramatically as Germany's cities grew enormously
over the course of the nineteenth century and the country's population became
ever more urbanized. 137 In addition, large urban agglomerations began to
appear for the first time. 138 Prussian and Imperial governments, and apparently
even the bourgeois elite, had at least two closely linked reasons to view this
phenomenon with alarm.
First, the development of a modem industrial economy posed a threat to
traditional culture as embodied in the landscape and its tillers, the peasants.
Germany has a long-standing tradition, going back to the Renaissance, of
seeing nature as a unified whole encompassing fields, woodland, and towns-
a kind of nature-as-garden. 139 Thus, the German landscape includes and is
constituted by human cultivation. 14 This gives the peasant cultivator an
important role as bearer of national identity. It is in this context that one
should see the German elite's nineteenth-century reaction against "Unkultur,"
the dehumanizing and deracinating effects of industrialization. German
conservative bourgeois constructed "an idealized vision of the preindustrial..
. period, the good old days when the German peasant tilled his German soil,
Germany).
133. See GUNLICKS, supra note 52, at 2.
134. Id. at 9.
135. See KRABBE, supra note 132, at 16.
136. See id. at 11.
137. Between 1871 and 1919, the percentage of the German population living in cities of more
than 100,000 rose from 4.8 to 21.3; the percentage in cities of 10,000 to 100,000 rose from 7.7 to 13.4.
See KRABBE, supra note 132, at 71.
138. Examples are Berlin and the Rhine-Ruhr industrial belt between Dortmund and Duisburg.
See id. at 74-75, 84-85.
139. See SIMON SCHAMA, LANDSCAPE AND MEMORY 95-100 (1996) (citing Renaissance
German artwork and natural history treatises that portray German forests as wholesome and
economically productive).
140. It is arguable that this approach to nature as a human-tended garden infuses the broader
European, and not just the German, view of the agricultural landscape. See Thomson, supra note 96, at
563-64 (describing the EU view of the peasant population as guardian of the landscape).
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the age of the 'fully rounded German personality."",14' With the departure of
the peasants for the cities, this view of nature as a kind of garden became
annexed to a certain despairing conservatism. A Romantic view of the
German medieval past as a heroic era was conjoined with a critique of
"industrial capitalism and metropolitan life, seeing both as corrosive of the
moral solidarity... inherent in traditional work and community. ' 142 Thus, the
German landscape came to be seen not just as a link with the past, but as a
threatened link with a more desirable past. Perhaps this phenomenon in part
explains why in Germany the modem large city was seen as an illegitimate
institution from its very inception.
143
Second, and even more importantly, the Prussian and later Imperial
governments saw the rise of the modem mass city as a direct political
threat. 144 The growth of an urban proletariat created a new kind of population
of doubtful political allegiance and even more doubtful morals. 14  This
necessitated an urban policy that would neutralize the revolutionary potential
of large cities. The German government's long-term response was an attempt
to foster the class of small shopkeepers and artisans, known as the Mittelstand,
that was seen as a bulwark of tradition.146 In any case, German urban policy
was dominated by an official desire to replace the modem city with something
"less threatening."' 147 It is therefore tempting to suppose that the subsequent
development of German land-use regulation should be interpreted in light of a
continuing attempt to reinforce existing hierarchical social relationships
within established communities. 148  This policy has had important
ramifications for land-use controls.
During the Imperial period, the German government wished to
encourage strong city governments that could provide local reinforcement for
the conservative monarchy. Accordingly, the central government favored a
practice known as Eingemeindung, annexation by existing cities of their
141. Franziska Bollery & Kristiana Hartmann, A Patriarchal Utopia: The Garden City and
Housing Reform in Germany at the Turn of the Century, in THE RISE OF MODERN URBAN PLANNING
1800-1914, at 135, 147 (Anthony Sutcliffe ed., 1980).
142. SCHAMA, supra note 139, at 113.
143. Unified Germany's first chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, once claimed that "the true
Prussian people" did not reside in cities. BRIAN LADD, URBAN PLANNING AND CIVIC ORDER IN
GERMANY, 1860-1914, at 15 (1990).
144. An important aspect of the threat that lies outside the scope of this Note is that peasants'
flight from the land challenged the hegemony of the landed Prussian ruling class, which relied on their
labor. Perhaps the most famous social scientific treatment of this issue is BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.,
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: LORD AND PEASANT IN THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN WORLD (1966).
145. See ANTHONY SUTCLIFFE, TOWARDS THE PLANNED CITY: GERMANY, BRITAIN, THE
UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 1780-1914, at 28 (1981).
146. See GEOFFREY CROSSICK & HEINZ-GERHARD HAUPT, THE PETITE BOURGEOISIE IN EUROPE
1780-1914: ENTERPRISE, FAMILY, AND INDEPENDENCE 144 (1995).
147. LADD, supra note 143, at 244.
148. More research is needed to investigate whether contemporary German land-use policies
still reflect this solicitude for the small-town petite bourgeoisie. Should German restraints on
commercial development outside downtowns be seen simply as an attempt to encourage small, family-
run retail establishments? Or was (and is) the goal broader: to use the neighborhood structure, with its
pattern of residence interspersed with small shops, to uphold good morals and social continuity?
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growing working-class suburbs. 149 Between 1885 and 1918, more than two
thirds of all cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants absorbed some
neighboring towns.150 Since World War I, every subsequent German regime
has endorsed this annexation policy.' 51 The policy was intended to preempt
the formation of revolutionary municipalities by subjecting them to
conservative town elites. 152 But even more importantly, these annexations
were supposed to facilitate coordinated land-use planning by making the
administrative entity of the city coextensive with the city as an economic
space.
153
This policy of annexation and consolidation coincided with the
development of another important principle: that the Ldnder (and, later,
municipalities) had a right and a duty to supervise the extension of the built-
up area along major thoroughfares leading out of town. So-called
Fluchtliniengesetze (roughly, laws on lines of extension) were first introduced
into the German state of Baden in 1868 and into Prussia in 1875. 54 Both these
policies, annexation and supervision of city-extension, stand for the principle
that city growth is a matter to be determined by public policy, not by the
untrammeled will of developers. As was suggested above, this principle is
strongly present in contemporary German land-use regulation. 155 It reflects the
continuing German view of the city as the political expression of a
geographically circumscribed community that calls for coordinated land-use
decisions. Finally, Imperial Germany also developed the modem theory and
practice of professional urban planning as official policy.156 The goal of this
planning activity in Imperial Germany was to entrench ideas of decent city life
derived from the ideal of the small autonomous city of the country's past.
149. See KRABBE, supra note 132, at 95-98.
150. Seeid.at95.
151. An administratively unified "Greater Berlin" was created by an act of the Prussian
legislature (Landtag) in 1920 under the Weimar Republic. See KRABBE, supra note 132, at 96-97. The
Nazis created a similar administrative entity for the Hamburg metropolitan area in 1937. See id. at 97.
Finally, the annexation policy has continued under the contemporary Federal Republic: In 1975, the
Land of Baden-Wilrttemberg carried out a forced consolidation of its municipalities that reduced their
total number from 3379 to 1110. See id. at 98.
152. See LADD, supra note 143, at 223. Krabbe also suggests that the policy ofEingemeindung
was adopted in part to prevent wealthy people from leaving the jurisdiction of the central city for
wealthy suburban enclaves, thus impairing the tax base of the city they left behind. Such a consideration
seems to indicate a determination by the German government to force a leading political role onto an
urban bourgeoisie that might have preferred to escape from large cities altogether. See KRABBE, supra
note 132, at 95.
153. See KRABBE, supra note 132, at 96-98.
154. See id. at 79; see also StrCLIFFE, supra note 145, at 19, 26 (emphasizing the role of the
Fluchtliniengesetze in strengthening the powers of municipalities in urban planning and creating a sense
that they had a duty to be a part of urban policy).
155. See supra Section ll.B.
156. Krabbe argues that Germany was in fact the first European country to produce either a
recognized profession and science of urban planning or a coherent policy of official support for it. See
KRABBE, supra note 132, at 79.
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Under German planning doctrines, new cities, like older towns, were not
permitted to capitulate to modem anonymity.
157
The aggressive German intervention in cities' shape has been matched
by a policy of municipal intervention in the actual market for urban land. The
prevention of a housing crisis, with its implications of working-class misery
and possible revolt, was one of the goals behind the Imperial government's
policy of encouraging decent housing conditions for workers.158 This in turn
led to the rise of a practice known as Umlegung (reparceling), under which a
city had the power to expropriate small plots of privately owned land so that
they could be consolidated and developed in accordance with a municipal
plan.159 Cities such as Frankfurt am Main managed to gain ownership of as
much as half their surface area, giving them substantial power over their own
development. 160
German land-use policy since the end of the Empire in 1918 shows a
continuation, at least by democratic regimes, of the earlier goal of softening
the modem city.161 This policy, moreover, has been pursued at ever higher
levels of government. Under the Weimar Republic (1918-33), a highly
successful planning authority for the Ruhr coal-mining area known as the
Siedlungsverband Rukhrkohlenbezirk was inaugurated in 1920 to create order
in a chaotically developed industrial region. This experiment attracted such
extensive imitation that by 1931 thirty percent of the surface area of Germany,
which contained fifty-eight percent of the population, fell within the
jurisdiction of such planning commissions. 162
This also confirmed a policy shift away from the pre-World War I
Imperial government's emphasis on giving cities administrative tools to
promote land-use policy, in favor of coordinated action by higher levels of
government.163 Over the years, the scope of land-use planning has been
broadened in post-World War II Germany so that the scope of contemporary
social change can be fully taken into account.164 By the post-World War II
period, Germany had been thoroughly prepared for the national policy
embodied in the BROG. 165
157. See LADD, supra note 143, at 136.
158. See Logan, supra note 99, at 382.
159. See LADD, supra note 143, at 200-01.
160. See KRABBE, supra note 132, at 82-83.
161. Interestingly, the National Socialist regime of 1933-45 inherited previous German
governments' interest in city planning as an important aspect of national policy. Indeed, the Nazis may
be credited with the first instance of coordinated national land-use planning in Germany under the
supervision of the Reich Planning Office (Reichstellefiir Raumordnung). See Larsen, supra note 48, at
976. However, the Nazis seemed to have replaced the more conventional goal of making cities attractive
and livable with the goal of making them monuments to the regime's power. A number of cities were
singled out as "Fahrerstidte" ('Tihrer cities"), to be extensively redesigned and filled with massive
pharaonic buildings. World War II, of course, scotched most of these plans. See KRABBE, supra note
132, at 87-88.
162. See Larsen, supra note 48, at 976.
163. See KRABBE, supra note 132, at 98.
164. See id. at 82.
165. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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Finally, it may seem paradoxical to argue that the assumption of land-
use regulatory power by ever higher levels of government in both Germany
and Switzerland testifies to the power of the ideal of the autonomous city
community. But this paradox is illusory, because the distinction between the
power of the federal government and the Land or canton on the one hand and
that of the municipality on the other obscures the real issue: Whose interest do
these policies serve?
In answer, it has already been argued that many features of Swiss and
German policy can be thought of as measures to defend existing cities. If we
compare the tightness of German and Swiss land-use policies with the
opportunities for evasion of municipal laws in the United States, we have to
ask: Is it really accurate to regard American municipal governments as
possessing strong land-use powers when they have very little power over land
use within adjacent municipalities or in unincorporated land? Such "strength"
seems to have a very perverse meaning for the municipalities involved!
Arguably, giving power to Ldnder and cantons rather than to cities can be
understood as a way of preventing the fragmentation of land-use control that
undermines existing cities in the United States. In short, by preventing towns
from competing with each other, the state protects them from destabilizing
competition and secures their monopoly position as centers of higher-level
cultural, economic, and political functions. Thus, it is the state that serves the
cities, and not the other way around.
166
In conclusion, then, whatever the administrative arrangements involved,
at the most fundamental level German and Swiss policy constitutes a
concerted effort to preserve the profusion of thriving small- and medium-sized
cities bequeathed by the two countries' histories. In turn, this concern with the
viability of cities stems from a historically determined understanding of the
social and political function of the city.
B. The City in U.S. Public Law: The Attack on Urban Autonomy
If German and Swiss land-use policies can be traced to a history of
strong cities, American policies can be traced to cities that were weak-weak
both in their legal status and in their political and cultural prestige. As will
become clear, American ideas of the good community, and consequently of
land-use controls, have been driven by a desire to create wholesome private
spaces for the individual and the family, not to shore up the city as a central
pillar of public order. Escape from urbanity, not the regulation of urbanity, has
been the goal of American land-use controls.
166. Indeed, Germany, like Switzerland, has a long-standing constitutional tradition upholding
the principle of urban autonomy against both the federal and Land governments. For a brief discussion
of German constitutional law on the status of cities and the relevant post-World War II jurisprudence,
see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTTUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 81-84 (1994).
German land-use policy is thus only one of the ways in which German political institutions reflect the
idea that the cities are a foundational part of the polity, and not simply administrative agents of the state.
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The weakness of American cities can be traced as far back as the
colonial period. Monkkonen has argued that from their inception colonial
American cities differed from their Old World predecessors. 17Arising after
the establishment of the nation-state, American cities never had the experience
of political power that European ones did.168 Moreover, they did not enjoy the
control over local trade that we observed in the German hometowns, and there
was no constellation of independent cities like that of central Europe. 169 Even
more importantly, American cities lacked the trappings of sovereignty and
separateness: charters, guilds, and prestige.
170
If early American cities were not the political overlords of subjugated
peripheries, what then was their function? It appears that from a very early
date American cities typically functioned as regional nodes of a national
trading economy. 171 Such a situation clearly contrasts with the model of the
autonomous city presiding over its little kingdom that prevailed in early
modem Germany and Switzerland and that later was adopted by Prussian
officialdom. In consequence, American towns were unable to enforce
restrictions on building within their borders, as the affected property owner
could always escape into an unregulated hinterland. 172
Intellectual trends after American independence accentuated the
weakness of American cities. Frug claims that American cities have been
enfeebled by legislation and court decisions of the nineteenth century that
were motivated by a conscious liberal hostility to cities.173 City government,
formerly seen as the privilege of a group of citizens as against outsiders, came
to be seen as a subsidiary instance of state government. Municipal
corporations, Chancellor Kent wrote, "are invested with subordinate
legislative powers to be exercised for local purposes connected with the public
good, and such powers are subject to the control of the legislature of the
state." 174 Most notably, it was in this period that "Dillon's Rule," still the
predominant American doctrine of urban public law, was developed in John F.
Dillon's Treatise on the Law of Municipal Corporations.75 Under Dillon's
Rule, cities are mere "creatures of the state," not separate bearers of
167. See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, AMERICA BECOMES URBAN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. CITIES
AND TOWNS, 1780-1980, at 66 (1988).
168. Seeid. at64.
169. See id. at 42-43.
170. Seeid. at51.
171. For example, in a study of early 19th-century Syracuse, New York, and its hinterland in
Onondaga County, Miller has argued that, unlike European cities, American towns did not originate as
the center of a local polity based on an economy of peasant agriculture. Rather, from its first settlement
by white Americans, regional development in urban America was driven by and occurred within the
framework of an existing national economy. See ROBERTA BALSTAD MILLER, CITY AND HINTERLAND: A
CASE STUDY OF URBAN GROWTH AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 156 (1979).
172. See MONKKONEN, supra note 167, at 57-59.
173. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1980).
174. Id. at 1104 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 275 (3d ed.
1836)).
175. See Frug, supra note 173, at 1109, 1112 (citing JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (Chicago, James Cookcroft & Co. 1st ed. 1872)).
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democratic legitimacy, and any powers delegated to them are to be narrowly
construed by the courts.
7 6
Frug argues that this attack on the power and prestige of cities took place
because nineteenth-century liberals saw cities as vestiges of pre-modem
corporate privilege standing between the "'Sovereignty of the State and the
Sovereignty of the Individual.' '' 177 Cities, for American liberals, were
instruments of pure repression, a medieval edifice of power that had to be tom
down to make all citizens equal under the law. 178 Turn-of-the-century
Progressives, heirs to this tradition, did their best to depoliticize municipal
government.
By the steps they took to reinforce the public/private distinction, the reformers reinforced
the powerlessness of cities. Their efforts to transform the cities helped to erode further
the sense of the city as a center of political autonomy or of direct democracy. Today,
almost half of American cities have "non-partisan" elections, commission governments,
or city managers. In the place of democracy are the ideas of expertise, objective
decisionmaking, and government by rational rules.
17 9
One obvious contrast that emerges from Frug's observations resides in
the different uses to which nineteenth-century America and nineteenth-century
Germany put their cities. As we have seen, German rulers and officials such
as Stein accepted the time-honored model of the city as a building block of the
state.180 They sought both to nurture the city and to shape it for their own
purposes. In contrast, American politicians appear to have sought to tear down
the political structures of the urban community altogether. Hartog describes
how the New York Corporation, originally in possession of an ill-defined mix
of public and private powers derived from a royal charter, was transformed
into an administrative arm of New York State charged with "using a public
bureaucracy to provide public goods for public consumption."''1  Rather than
shore up the city to strengthen the state, American politicians instead
subordinated the city as a political entity. As was pointed out even at the time,
the arguable result of this subordination of the city was a loss of interest in
city government on the part of the voting public. 82 Similarly, the attack on
176. See Frug, supra note 173, at 1059, 1112.
177. Id. at 1088 (quoting 0. GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES 87 (1958)).
178. See Frug, supra note 173, at 1106 ("[R]ecognizing the rights of the city as an exercise of
the freedom of association would frustrate both the interests of the state and the individual and would
defy the liberal attempt to dissolve the power of groups in favor of the state and the individual.").
179. Id. at 1119 (footnote omitted).
180. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
181. HENDRiK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870, at 8 (1983).
182. See Frank J. Goodnow, The Historical Development of the City's Position (1904),
reprinted in URBAN GOVERNMENT: A READER IN ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS 67, 81 (Edward C.
Banfield ed., 1969) ("In those states where... central interference [with the city government] has been
most marked the people of the cities have very largely lost interest in the municipal governments .... ).
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municipal city government led to a loss of the sense that purely local interests
have their own legitimacy as against the interest of the state and nation.183
Taken together, Frug's argument and Hartog's story of New York City
capture certain distinctive features of American liberalism, specifically, its
hostility to constraints on the individual's freedom to engage in economic
transactions and its suspicion of ancient institutions claiming the right to
subordinate the individual. In the eyes of proponents of American liberalism,
the city, with its enforced togetherness and its powerful istitutions, needed to
be dissolved into a conceptually neutral administrative agglomeration of
private residences. Warner, in a study of Philadelphia, writes that in the
American tradition "the goal of a city is to be a community of private money
makers." 184 Indeed, Warner attributes Philadelphia's failure to make adequate
provision for middle- and working-class housing to this tradition of
"privatism."' 18 5
Unwilling to entrust the city with control over development, the middle
classes and wealthy decided to forego urban residence altogether. Warner has
also documented how the middle class gradually abandoned central Boston for
outlying "streetcar suburbs" as early as the nineteenth century.18 6 In turn, this
trend made the formation of metropolitan governments through German-style
annexation impossible, as suburban residents used municipal boundaries to
insulate themselves from urban problems. As Jackson writes, "Resistance to
annexation is symptomatic of the view that metropolitan problems are
unsolvable and that the only sensible solution is isolation."
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Moreover, the American view of the city as an unhealthy agglomeration
of individuals that should be avoided rather than a little polity needing to be
managed seems to be matched with an American view of nature that is
different from its German counterpart. Instead of a cultivated garden tended
by the people of a city and the surrounding subordinated hinterland, nature
was idealized as a wilderness that was also identified with untrammeled
political freedom. Thus, Schama describes the role of forest imagery in the art
and literature of the independent United States. He cites a poetic depiction of
183. See id. at 82 ("lt is practically impossible to secure a solution of any one of our
municipal problems uninfluenced by the consideration of the effect which the solution proposed may
have on questions of state and national politics.").
184. SAM BASS WARNER, JR., THE PRIVATE CITY: PHILADELPHIA IN THREE PERIODS OF ITS
GROWTH, at x (1968).
185. See id. at 205-14. Specifically, Warner argues that, in the early 20th century, Philadelphia
business and civic elites poured money into downtown public works projects, see id. at 205-08, while
neglecting to supply existing residential neighborhoods with the public amenities such as schools, parks,
and adequate shopping areas that might have made such neighborhoods more acceptable to an
increasingly affluent population, see id. at 208. Finally, Warner criticizes the same civic elites for
permitting development on the city's periphery to take place in a haphazard and substandard manner, a
process he thinks might have been avoided had Philadelphia imitated contemporary European cities by
setting up its own, municipally owned, land development and housing institutions. See id. at 213. For a
discussion of aggressive government intervention in municipal land development in Germany, see supra
text accompanying notes 158-160.
186. See SAM BASS WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS 162-63 (1978) (chronicling the gradual
bifurcation of Boston housing between middle-class suburbs and a poor, largely immigrant, central city).
187. KENNETH T. JACKsON, THE CRABGRASS FRONTIER 155 (1985).
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forests as cathedrals that proclaims: "'The groves were God's first
temples.'
188
On the other hand, such a view of nature as something sacred that is
unspoiled by civilization also implies that the landscape is a kind of social
tabula rasa. There appears to be no American equivalent to the German and
Swiss view of the countryside as a part of national culture that must be
safeguarded by the polity. Rose has argued with insight that in order to be
effective, land-use controls must be based on a certain desired "end-state"
goal for the regulated area-simply put, one has to know what one wants
before one can figure out how to get it.189 In the United States, the countryside
has no obvious "end-state." The landscape is separate from the city and
therefore a desirable place of refuge from it, yet the countryside is not seen as
harboring any particular cultural significance. It seems fair to say that in
contrast to the European tradition of landscape regulation, in the United States
the preservation of agricultural landscapes is treated primarily as the proper
subject of private charitable activities rather than state or federal regulation.
As a result, current public policy in the United States does not seem to set as
an explicit goal the preservation of the appearance and way of life of the
countryside and rural towns in the path of metropolitan expansion.
190
Thus, America combines a depolificized urban space with a rural space
that, while it may be a haven from urban problems, has not been formulated as
worthy of preservation. The combination has created a glorification of private
rusticity that imbues American culture. For example, explaining Frank Lloyd
Wright's influence on postwar architecture, Hall comments, "Wright based his
thinking on a social premise: that it was desirable to preserve the sort of
independent rural life of the homesteaders he knew in Wisconsin around the
1890s." 19' In short, the attack on urbanity leaves private, rustic life as the
normative form of the American community.
With this background in mind, it becomes possible to tell a coherent
story about why there has been so little political support in the United States
for more aggressive measures to protect the traditional compact city and
188. SCHAMA, supra note 139, at 200 (quoting A Forest Hymn by William Cullen Bryant).
Compare the following observation made by Henry David Thoreau after a visit to a Roman Catholic
church in Montreal, Quebec: "In Concord, to be sure, we do not need such. Our forests are such a
church, far grander and more sacred." HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A YANKEE IN CANADA (1853), reprinted
in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 243,253 (Carl Bode ed., Viking Press rev. ed. 1964).
189. Carol Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837, 878 (1983) (contrasting coastal areas and historic districts, where the
desired end-state is retention of the status quo, with "developing areas, where--in the absence of
concrete proposals--we seldom have a clear vision of the end-state we desire, or even what the
intermediate states along the way will look like"). -
190. For example, the transformation of the Pennsylvania Amish country into bland exurbia
proceeds apace, despite the efforts of private charitable organizations to save it. See Herbert Muschamp,
Trying to Save an Old Way of Life From Progress, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1998, at AR35. An interesting
exception must be made for Vermont, which, as we have seen, has an official policy of preserving its
towns and landscapes. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
191. HALL, supra note 33, at 53.
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agricultural countryside. Without the idea of the city as a necessary part of the
social order, no consensus could possibly form around any program to
entrench any particular model of the city, let alone one as stylized as the
German-Swiss model. Moreover, the legal and cultural weakness of the city
(and to a lesser extent that of the tended countryside) has left the United States
without a dignified conception of metropolitan public space. Instead, town life
in the United States, and hence land-use controls, has been organized around a
kind of flight: a flight into privacy and independence captured by the detached
suburban house. This flight into domesticity is probably linked to the distinct
hostility to cities commented on by Frug. 192 Domesticity and nature are
linked: The appeal of the suburb has been that its green, rustic setting
symbolizes separation from a denigrated public space.
These observations also permit us to revisit the issue of America's
extreme reliance on zoning to the exclusion of planning. Logan argues that at
the heart of American zoning lies the desire to remove low-status segments of
the population from the proximity of more favored citizens. Comparing
America with Germany-the country from which the idea of zoning was first
imported into the United States193-he finds that
[w]hat distinguished the German from the American zoning idea was primarily the size
of the job to be done by this one tool. The separation of uses was not a central objective
for zoning in Germany ... In the United States the desire to separate out undesirable
population classes [primarily immigrants and racial minorities] through the zoning of
places of business with which those classes were associated was a central motivation for
early ordinances.
194
The point is not that well-to-do Americans were more hostile to the poor
than were German elites. Rather, it is that whereas the German state sought to
contain its workers in cities dominated by an established elite, in the United
States the elite sought security by escape from the city itself, and indeed from
the idea of the city.
This history also explains the postwar course of federal and state
intervention in land-use regulation. The federal and state governments could
intervene to protect individuals from "spillover effects" and "externalities."
They could pass environmental laws to protect public health. But they could
not transform an implicitly private construct-relations between property
owners-into an explicitly public one-the regulation of public space. As a
result, while Germany and Switzerland put the finishing touches on their
national land-use regimes in the postwar decades, the United States could only
move to ameliorate the worst consequences of undisciplined development
through patchwork state and federal reform of land-use and environmental
laws.
In many respects, postwar federal policy seems to show that the
American city has come to be understood as a kind of neutral physical space
192. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text.
193. See Logan, supra note 99, at 377 (noting that early American planners openly borrowed
the idea of zoning ordinances from Germany).
194. Id. at 383.
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within which a wide variety of policy experiments can be implemented
without much regard to the extremely disruptive effects they are likely to have
on existing land-use patterns. To take only a few examples, the federal
government largely paid the bill for an enormous system of interstate
highways that encouraged diffuse settlement patterns, all the while starving
public transit of funds.195 Federal tax policy also subsidized home ownership
by making mortgage payments tax-deductible, thereby promoting construction
of detached houses and, arguably, suburban construction and middle-class
flight.196 Indeed, one observer has suggested that the cities of Canada
benefited from their own federal government's weakness, which prevented it
from embarking on such programs.
197
In summary, then, American land-use controls reflect the intellectual
history of the American town. Cities without the prestige of their European
counterparts have no claim on the official support represented by the German
and Swiss land-use regimes. Rather, they have fallen victim to the
consequences of public hostility to urban living.
IV. CONCLUSION: LAND-USE REGIMES AS RESPONSES TO MODERNITY
The differences between American and German-Swiss attitudes to land-
use are so profound that they lie embedded and hidden in the foundations of
public life, rather than visible in the political structures.
Thus, in post-World War H Germany and Switzerland, governments
recognized the threat to the traditional urban form inherent in an affluent
society characterized by a widespread desire for upward economic mobility
that was expressed in the aspiration for home and car ownership. Officials
resolved to manage economic growth to preserve the land-use status quo. In
short, land-use regulation for the Swiss and the Germans is a way of
restraining the modem economy to protect a traditional way of life. It enforces
a prescriptive model of the good city and of the good countryside, and
requires the market to operate within that model.
Indeed, German and Swiss views of land-use have evolved to the point
where a national land-use regime is seen as an essential part of the
construction of the polity. As one Swiss land-use expert has put it, land-use
planning is part of the state's ongoing responsibility to guarantee "the
195. Under the Interstate Highway Act of 1956, Congress paid 90 percent of the expenses of
highway construction. See Federal-Aid ighway Act, ch. 462, sec. 108(e), 70 Stat. 374, 379 (1956)
(current version at 23 U.S.C. § 109G) (1994)); see also JACKSON, supra note 187, at 249 (discussing the
Interstate Highway Act). In addition, "75 percent of government expenditures for transportation in the
United States in the postwar generation went for highways as opposed to 1 percent for urban mass
transit." Id. at 250 (citing Sen. Gaylord Nelson).
196. See JACKSON, supra note 187, at 294.
197. See Graham Hallett, Conclusion, in LAND AND HOUsING POLICIES IN EUROPE AND THE
USA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 182, 194 (Graham Hallett ed., 1988) (citing M.A. Goldberg, Housing
and Land Prices in Canada and the US, in PUBLIC PROPERTY? THE HABITAT DEBATE CONTINUED 207,
235-37 (Lawrence B. Smith & Michael Walker eds., 1977)).
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preconditions of life" ("Lebensvoraussetzungen").198  He writes of
Switzerland's national land-use planning: "Its object-briefly summarized-is
living space (Lebensraum), that is, the space in which life is to be preserved
and in which individual and social life develops."
199
Contemporary America, on the other hand, is so remote from the
German and Swiss idea of the town that there is no intellectual basis for
duplicating land-use controls which derive from that idea. We cannot simply
scrap the ideological background that gave us the metropolitan form we do
have. The American public law hostility to the city has left a heavy
ideological mortgage.
There is, in fact, some reason to think that the American approach to
building cities reveals a rejection of ideas about traditional city form that may
be more extreme than in any other country. In other words, German and Swiss
attitudes toward the city may be more typical of attitudes in most Western
countries. Two English-speaking countries with close cultural links to the
United States furnish support for this claim. Our northern neighbor Canada,
despite its cultural and historical closeness to the United States, has adopted
an urban policy emphasizing "gradual expansion of the urban envelope...
seeded by higher-density 'nodes' where office, retail, and residential land uses
occur in healthy mixes., 200 Likewise, the United Kingdom has had a
succession of national land-use policies since the 1940s. These have
emphasized maintaining the existing distribution of regional populations and
surrounding central London with a greenbelt of non-urbanizable land.20 1
Notably, the first of these policies was enacted by the post-World War II
Labour Party government in an atmosphere of "informed agreement among
rational men of good will" and was seen as being relatively uncontroversial.20 2
The policies of these two countries, otherwise so similar to the United States,
seem to suggest that there is something unusual and radical in the U.S.
willingness to forego similar policies.
Thus, an important conclusion of this Note is that our land-use regime
must be seen in the context of broader American attitudes toward the relation
between individual and community. If German and Swiss land-use regulations
place the individual in the center of a managed landscape and a restrictive
community, American land-use regulation seems to reject this idea of a
socially situated self. If German and Swiss land-use policies reflect a dogged
determination to control the modem town and make it conform to an inherited
idea of the well-made community , American land-use controls represent a
willingness to experiment with unprecedented forms of urban life.
198. Lendi, supra note 98, at 83.
199. Id. (author's translation).
200. Tamim Raad & Jeff Kenworthy, The US and Us, ALTERNATIVES J., Winter 1998, at 14,
14.
201. See LIGHT, supra note 106, at 261.
202. Id. at 264.
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